






























































































































































Improving Survey Measures of Household 
Inﬂ  ation Expectations
Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Simon Potter, Robert Rich, 
Giorgio Topa, and Wilbert van der Klaauw 
Expectations about future inﬂ  ation are generally thought to play an 
important role in households’ decisions about spending and saving. 
They are also of great interest to central bankers, who take them 
into account when determining policy or assessing the effectiveness 
of communications with the public. To help improve existing survey 
measures of inﬂ  ation expectations, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York recently joined with other institutions and academic 
consultants to develop a set of survey questions that will yield more 
reliable information on households’ inﬂ  ation expectations, inﬂ  ation 
uncertainty, and expectations about future wage changes.
A 
wide range of household decisions—whether to purchase a home, to save, or to take out 
 a student loan—can be affected by expectations about future inﬂ  ation.  Measures of 
 inﬂ  ation expectations, and the degree of uncertainty attached to expectations, are of 
direct interest to policymakers, who track and forecast economic conditions.
Indeed, inﬂ  ation expectations play an important role in modern monetary policy. Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (2007) has argued that accurate and consistent measures of 
inﬂ  ation expectations are important for calibrating monetary policy and deepening the Fed’s 
understanding of economic behavior. 
People’s expectations about inﬂ  ation—and hence inﬂ  ation itself—are determined in large 
part by how they believe the central bank will conduct monetary policy. For that reason, central 
banks communicate explicit or quasi-explicit inﬂ  ation targets to help “anchor” the public’s 
long-run expectations about inﬂ  ation. 
For several decades, economists have relied on surveys to measure these expectations. 
However, relatively little is known about how respondents interpret the survey questions, how 
their interpretation affects their responses, and how much their expectations inﬂ  uence their 
behavior and beliefs about the economy. 
A major source of information on U.S. households’ inﬂ  ation expectations is the Reuters/
University of Michigan Survey of Consumers. Often referred to as “the Michigan Survey,” it 
randomly surveys a nationally representative sample of about 500 households each month. 
In addition to asking questions about current economic conditions, the survey solicits year-
ahead and ﬁ  ve-to-ten-year-ahead forecasts for expected changes to “prices in general.” These 
questions have remained essentially unchanged for thirty years. 
Given the importance of inﬂ  ation expectations, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
in collaboration with the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and other partners, initiated the 
Household Inﬂ  ation Expectations Project in late 2006 to assess the feasibility of improving 
survey-based measures of consumers’ inﬂ  ation and wage expectations.1 Our project to date 
1 The number of consumer surveys has increased markedly around the world during the past decade. To improve 
the overall quality of the available data, several central banks have launched their own surveys of inﬂ  ation 
expectations or have contracted with third parties to develop and conduct new surveys on their behalf.2
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has had two components: an assessment of the usefulness of the 
Michigan survey’s questions on inﬂ  ation expectations, and the 
development and implementation—on an experimental basis—
of an alternative survey of household expectations. 
In this edition of Current Issues, we describe the structure of our 
project in more detail and present early results. Our assessment of 
the Michigan Survey conﬁ  rms the existence of certain limitations: 
We ﬁ  nd that the wording of the questions invites differing inter-
pretations, that respondents have no means to express uncertainty 
about future inﬂ  ation, and that the survey format elicits little or 
no information about wage expectations or the process by which 
respondents form and revise their inﬂ  ation expectations. 
Our effort to develop and implement an alternative survey also 
yields important ﬁ  ndings. A question asking directly about the “rate 
of inﬂ  ation” rather than “prices in general” leads to a measure of 
expected future inﬂ  ation outcomes that is more informative and less 
susceptible to diverse interpretations. We also conﬁ  rm earlier ﬁ  ndings 
of differences in inﬂ  ation expectations across demographic groups 
and document marked changes in the size of these differences over 
time. Our new measure of the uncertainty of consumers’ inﬂ  ation 
expectations indicates that uncertainty has declined considerably 
since mid-2008, while disagreement among respondents—a com-
monly used proxy for uncertainty—increased sharply during much 
of the sample period. Finally, our measure of wage expectations 
reveals a persistent expectation that real wages will decline.2
The Household Inﬂ  ation Expectations Project
The Household Inﬂ  ation Expectations Project is a unique collabora-
tion among Federal Reserve research staff, academic economists, and 
psychologists at Carnegie Mellon University who specialize in behav-
ioral decision making as well as risk perception and communication. 
The project’s main goals are 1) to assess the information content of 
the Michigan Survey and the validity of its measures, 2) to improve 
the quality of existing surveys and to better align the measure-
ment of household inﬂ  ation expectations with the central role that 
inﬂ  ation expectations play in the formation and communication of 
monetary policy, 3) to improve the understanding of how consumers 
form and update inﬂ  ation expectations, and 4) to assess the links 
between inﬂ  ation expectations and consumer behavior.
The project to date has been structured in three stages. The ﬁ  rst 
two stages—preliminary inquiries conducted through phone and 
Internet surveys—gauged how individuals interpreted the Michi-
gan Survey questions and how they would respond to alternative 
questions about future inﬂ  ation. The Internet survey also “piloted” 
questions on wage expectations and inﬂ  ation uncertainty to expand 
the information currently elicited by the Michigan Survey. These 
preliminary inquiries guided the ﬁ  nal formulation of the questions 
for the third stage of our project—the actual implementation of 
an alternative survey of household inﬂ  ation expectations.3 
2 See van der Klaauw et al. (2008) for a fuller account of our ﬁ  ndings.
3 Note that, by design, the number and identity of our respondents differed from 
one stage to the next.
Motivation for the Project
A major impetus for the HIEP was the recognition, shared by many 
economists, policymakers, and survey modelers, that the Michigan 
Survey and other existing surveys of inﬂ  ation expectations had 
signiﬁ  cant limitations.  
Wording of Questions Can Yield Different Interpretations. A feature of 
the Michigan and similar surveys is their use of simpliﬁ  ed word-
ing. For example, they ask about “prices in general” rather than the 
“rate of inﬂ  ation.” Studies of survey design suggest that the use of 
simpliﬁ  ed language provides no assurance that all respondents 
will interpret a question in the same way—or in a way that would 
be of interest to policymakers (see Bruine de Bruin [forthcoming] 
and Schwarz [1999]). Indeed, asking about prices in general leads 
respondents to think more about particular price changes that may 
ﬁ  gure prominently in their own experience than about changes in 
the overall price level. Moreover, when respondents focus on price 
changes speciﬁ  c to their own experience, they may tend to pay more 
attention to price changes that are larger (rather than smaller) and 
that reﬂ  ect increases (rather than decreases), especially for products 
purchased often (Bates and Gabor 1986; Jungermann et al. 2007; 
Ranyard et al. 2008). 
Point Forecasts Do Not Measure Inﬂ  ation Uncertainty. Many surveys 
of inﬂ  ation expectations ask only for point forecasts of inﬂ  ation—
that is, single-value estimates. However, consumers’ decisions may 
be affected not only by the expected level of inﬂ  ation, but also by 
uncertainty about future inﬂ  ation.4 To capture consumers’ uncer-
tainty about inﬂ  ation outcomes, survey modelers can elicit “density 
forecasts.” In a density forecast, respondents convey expectations 
in the form of a histogram by assigning probabilities to different 
possible outcomes.
Information on Wage Expectations Is Insufﬁ  cient. Surveys of inﬂ  ation 
expectations capture little, if any, information about wage expec-
tations. Yet wage expectations, like inﬂ  ation expectations, affect 
consumers’ decisions about consumption and leisure across different 
periods and are thus of great value for understanding and forecast-
ing economic behavior.5 Moreover, because price-setting behavior by 
ﬁ  rms depends at least partly on ﬁ  rms’ total labor costs, wage dynam-
ics are an important determinant of expected and actual inﬂ  ation.
Surveys Provide Limited Information about How Expectations Are 
Formed. Existing surveys provide scant insight into how individuals 
form and update their expectations about future inﬂ  ation. Yet such 
knowledge would be of great value to monetary policymakers: As 
argued by Bernanke (2007), “a fuller understanding of the public’s 
learning rules would improve the central bank’s capacity to assess 
its own credibility, to evaluate the implications of its policy decisions 
and communications strategy, and perhaps to forecast inﬂ  ation.” 
One way to evaluate how expectations are revised is to track 
the responses of the same group of individuals over time. Such a 
4 For a discussion of alternative ways in which inﬂ  ation uncertainty affects 
economic decision making and welfare, see Golob (1994). 
5 Bernanke (2007) stresses the importance of collecting better information on 
wage expectations.“panel” dimension, however, is absent from most surveys of inﬂ  ation 
expectations. The Michigan Survey does have a panel element, but 
it is very limited: A subset of the respondents to the survey (roughly 
200 of the 500 individuals polled) are reinterviewed—but only once 
and only after an interval of six months. These follow-up interviews 
yield only limited data on which to base conclusions about how or 
why individuals modify their inﬂ  ation expectations.
Project Structure
We began the Household Inﬂ  ation Expectations Project in the 
summer of 2007 by holding a set of open-ended, semi-structured 
“cognitive interviews”—interviews that elicit information about how 
respondents interpret questions and arrive at a response. The cogni-
tive interviews, conducted by telephone, examined how respondents 
interpreted both the Michigan Survey’s question about expected 
changes to “prices in general” and a set of alternative questions 
about inﬂ  ation expectations. 
This ﬁ  rst stage of our project revealed that interviewees had 
diverse interpretations of the Michigan Survey question about “prices 
in general.” Some saw it as asking about inﬂ  ation, while others 
believed it was asking about speciﬁ  c prices they paid, particularly for 
food and gasoline. By contrast, interviewees were less likely to think of 
speciﬁ  c prices they had paid when asked for their expectations about 
the “rate of inﬂ  ation.”  In addition, we learned that interviewees often 
wanted to report ranges rather than point forecasts of inﬂ  ation, 
suggesting the presence of uncertainty in their forecasts.
These ﬁ  ndings helped determine our choice of alternative 
questions for measuring inﬂ  ation expectations—speciﬁ  cally, our 
decision to pose questions about the “rate of inﬂ  ation” as well as 
questions about “the prices of things you usually spend money 
on.” To ﬁ  nd out whether the results of our phone interviews with a 
small number of people would hold for a larger group, we initiated 
the second stage of our project, which involved the construction of 
survey “modules,” or sets of questions, to be added to the American 
Life Panel (ALP). The ALP—an existing Internet survey conducted 
by the RAND Corporation—served as our vehicle for contacting 
respondents. Our survey modules, administered to about 700 people, 
asked respondents to interpret the Michigan question about “prices 
in general” and our alternative question about the “rate of inﬂ  ation.” 
In addition, the modules included a preliminary set of questions 
that invited respondents to systematically express their expectations 
about wage changes as well as their uncertainty about their forecasts 
for both price inﬂ  ation and wage inﬂ  ation.6 
6 The survey modules were designed in collaboration with a team of behavioral 
psychologists from Carnegie Mellon University led by Wändi Bruine de Bruin and 
Baruch Fischhoff. Providing valuable input were Michael Bryan of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Olivier Armantier of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York; Andrew Levin and Arthur Kennickell of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System; academic consultants Charles Manski, Kenneth Wolpin, 
and Eric Johnson; and a team from the RAND Corporation’s Roybal Center for 
Financial Decision Making led by Jeff Dominitz and Arie Kapteyn. All modules 
were pilot-tested on small samples by the Carnegie Mellon team.
The third stage of our project, the implementation of our survey 
of household expectations, built upon the earlier phone and Internet 
inquiries. The survey instrument contained our new questions 
in their ﬁ  nal form and also included, for comparison, the main 
Michigan Survey questions. The American Life Panel again served 
as the vehicle for this ﬁ  nal set of queries, referred to as the “Fed-
ALP Panel” hereafter. The sample population consisted of Michigan 
Survey respondents who agreed to take part in further surveys after 
completing the Michigan questionnaire. Our survey, launched in 
November 2007, has been administered to this same group roughly 
every six weeks. 
Main Findings to Date
Wording of Questions
Reliable measurement requires that respondents agree with one 
another—and with economic modelers—on what the survey ques-
tions mean. If respondents vary in their interpretation of a question, 
their responses may display more disagreement than they otherwise 
would. Indeed, one feature that the Michigan Survey’s question about 
“prices in general” shares with other surveys is a high dispersion of 
responses around the median. This evidence of disagreement is in 
part related to observable characteristics of respondents such as age, 
gender, education, and income (see Bryan and Venkatu [2001a, b]). 
However, the differences in response across demographic groups far 
exceed the variations in inﬂ  ation experienced by the groups (see 
Hobijn et al. [2009]), and may reﬂ  ect some ambiguity in the question. 
Moreover, a large number of Michigan Survey respondents 
typically expect changes in “prices in general” to far exceed recently 
observed inﬂ  ation rates. For example, from May to July 2008, 
25 percent of the respondents expected price changes greater than or 
equal to 10 percent over the next twelve months. Other surveys have 
asked questions about past (realized) changes in prices and found 
that some of the dispersion of views about future price changes is 
associated with the dispersion of views about past price changes.
When we asked our respondents about expected changes to 
“prices in general” (the Michigan Survey question), we found that 
a signiﬁ  cant fraction believed we were inquiring about the prices 
they paid themselves—often prices that had increased or decreased 
markedly, such as those for food or gasoline (Bruine de Bruin et al.
2010a). This tendency to think more about prominent price changes 
in one’s own experience is particularly common among respon-
dents with lower ﬁ  nancial literacy (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2010b). By 
contrast, when we asked about expectations for the “rate of inﬂ  ation,” 
respondents tended to think less about a few salient price changes 
speciﬁ  c to their own experience and more about price changes 
across a broader set of items—a result that aligns more with econo-
mists’ deﬁ  nition of inﬂ  ation as a sustained increase in the overall 
price level. 
Although it was rated as somewhat more difﬁ  cult to answer than 
the “prices in general” question, our alternative question about the 
“rate of inﬂ  ation” had only a slightly higher (by less than 1 percent) 
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nonresponse rate and elicited expectations that were less strongly 
correlated with price expectations for gas and food. In addition, the 
question generated less disagreement, as indicated by the smaller 
interquartile range of the distribution of responses across partici-
pants.  The interquartile range—essentially, the range of the middle 
50 percent of responses—is a reliable measure of dispersion.7 In this 
case, the smaller range suggests that respondents interpreted our 
question in a more consistent way than the Michigan Survey ques-
tion. Our question also generated lower overall forecast uncertainty, 
as measured by the median (across individuals) of the density 
forecasts’ interquartile range. This ﬁ  nding holds across different time 
horizons with respect to expectations for both near- and long-term 
inﬂ  ation expectations as well as for perceptions of past inﬂ  ation.8
Forecast Uncertainty
The ability to measure and monitor movements in inﬂ  ation 
uncertainty is important for several reasons. Recent communications 
from the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and other 
central banks have discussed upside or downside risks to the 
economic outlook, highlighting the need for quantitative risk 
measures to be included in the policymaker’s toolkit. 
Furthermore, by tracking inﬂ  ation uncertainty, a central bank 
can assess its credibility and the effectiveness of its communications. 
An increase in uncertainty about future inﬂ  ation outcomes may be 
an early warning of eroding central bank credibility. Mishkin (2008) 
has suggested that a central bank may want to view the costs of 
inﬂ  ation in terms of both its level and its uncertainty. To the extent 
that uncertainty about future inﬂ  ation affects consumers’ decisions, 
measuring that uncertainty is of direct interest to policymakers 
because of the relevance for tracking and forecasting economic 
conditions.
Our survey has successfully implemented a probability-based 
version of the various alternative questions about inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions that takes the form of a density forecast.9 Questions about 
density forecasts and questions about point forecasts had similarly 
high response rates. Density forecasts were also consistent with other 
responses. For example, we ﬁ  nd respondents’ uncertainty about 
future inﬂ  ation realizations to be positively correlated with their use 
7 The interquartile range is deﬁ  ned as the difference between the 75th and the 
25th percentiles of a distribution and is less sensitive to extreme views (outliers) 
than are other measures of dispersion, such as the variance.
8 The Fed-ALP Panel also asked for respondents’ medium-term expectations 
(three years ahead) for the “rate of inﬂ  ation.” This time horizon was chosen for 
consistency with typical macroeconomic modeling of medium-term responses to 
shocks. Expected inﬂ  ation and inﬂ  ation uncertainty over the medium term may 
be important indicators for assessing the credibility of monetary policy objectives 
and the effectiveness of central bank communication.
9 We use a format similar to that employed in the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Bank of Italy’s Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth. To begin, we deﬁ  ne several possible “bins” for the 
rate of inﬂ  ation (for example, 0 percent to 2 percent, …, 12 percent or higher). We 
then ask respondents to assign probabilities—the “percentage chance”—to these 
predeﬁ  ned bins (see Bruine de Bruin et al. [2009] for details). Thereafter, we ﬁ  t a 
probability density to each respondent’s reported histogram.
of a range rather than a single value to report their forecast and with 
the width of the reported range.10 
Our results also indicate that disagreement between respondents, 
as captured by the dispersion in their point forecasts, is not always 
a good proxy for uncertainty about future inﬂ  ation.11 We measure 
disagreement as the interquartile range of the distribution of point 
forecasts across respondents, and median forecast uncertainty as the 
median (across respondents) of the interquartile range of an indi-
vidual respondent’s density forecast. As a measure, median forecast 
uncertainty describes a “typical” respondent’s uncertainty about 
future inﬂ  ation. As we observe below, disagreement and uncertainty 
about median forecasts exhibit very different patterns over time in 
our Fed-ALP Panel.
Wage Expectations
Because ﬁ  rms and workers may negotiate wage changes in line with 
their expectations for inﬂ  ation, data on wage expectations provide 
an additional source of information for analyzing inﬂ  ation dynam-
ics and the interaction between wage and price determination. 
Furthermore, discrepancies between expected changes in wages and 
expected inﬂ  ation may affect households’ ﬁ  nancial decisions. 
Unfortunately for economic analysts, information on wage 
expectations is particularly scarce. To address this deﬁ  cit, our survey 
includes questions that ask respondents to report their expectations 
for wage changes in the form of both point and density forecasts. 
Not surprisingly, respondents have found the question asking for a 
point forecast of the expected wage change to be clearer and easier to 
answer than questions asking for their expectations of the rate of in-
ﬂ  ation or of changes to prices in general. During the Fed-ALP Panel 
survey period of November 2007 to November 2009, respondents 
expected wages to rise signiﬁ  cantly less than prices (that is, they 
expected a decline in real wages) and they expressed less uncertainty 
about future wage changes than about future price changes.
Dynamics of Inﬂ  ation Expectations
To better understand the process by which individuals form and 
update their inﬂ  ation expectations, we conduct repeat surveys—at 
intervals of about six weeks—with the same panel of respondents. 
Our ﬁ  ndings point to considerable persistence in inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions and in uncertainty over time. We observe that those who are 
more uncertain are likelier to make greater (absolute) revisions to 
their point forecasts, a result suggesting that their estimates are more 
volatile. More details on observed patterns over time are given below.
Current Patterns over Time
Here we present trends for several of our measures of inﬂ  ation expec-
tations over the 2007-09 Fed-ALP Panel survey period. These trends 
10 See Bruine de Bruin et al. (2009) for additional ﬁ  ndings on internal consistency 
and the reliability of our uncertainty measure. 
11 Examining point and density forecasts of inﬂ  ation from the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters, Rich and Tracy (2010) ﬁ  nd little support for the use of 
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are of clear interest to policymakers, providing insight into the recent 
evolution of expectations about future price and wage inﬂ  ation. 
Point Forecasts
Recall that the “prices in general” question elicits responses that 
exhibit considerable differences across individuals in both levels and 
trends. Trends in year-ahead point forecasts in the Michigan Survey 
vary signiﬁ  cantly with respondents’ income levels (Chart 1). Lower 
income respondents report signiﬁ  cantly higher and more dispersed 
expectations, as captured by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the 
forecast distribution for each group. 
Part of this difference across income groups appears to reﬂ  ect 
fundamental differences in beliefs, and could therefore be important 
to track. At the same time, additional evidence from our own survey 
indicates that at least some of the differences across demographic 
groups are attributable to variation in ﬁ  nancial literacy. Part of this 
variation, in turn, relates to how much respondents think of salient 
prices they pay when forming their expectations; respondents who 
have lower ﬁ  nancial literacy think more about such prices.12 Com-
pared with expectations for “prices in general,” expectations for 
the “rate of inﬂ  ation” reveal a different time pattern for the median 
forecast of year-ahead inﬂ  ation (Chart 2), one that is generally lower 
and less variable over time. Moreover, they show a less dramatic 
increase during the gasoline price spike of 2008 as well as a smaller 
decline during the gasoline price drop at the end of that year.
Disagreement and Uncertainty
Year-ahead expectations for the “rate of inﬂ  ation” decrease over the 
sample period (Chart 3); in fact, we see a fairly pronounced decline 
in expectations from the levels during the summer of 2008 through 
12 For more on the ﬁ  ndings associated with ﬁ  nancial literacy, see Bruine de Bruin 
et al. (2010b).
year-end. The decrease likely reﬂ  ects the combination of falling 
prices for energy and other commodities as well as a large amount 
of economic slack during that episode. Over the same sample period, 
disagreement shows a considerable increase until the end of 2008, 
after which it begins a decline almost back to pre-crisis levels. 
Disagreement is especially high during the summer of 2008 
and reaches a peak that December—a spike that coincides with the 
federal funds rate nearing its lower bound of zero.13 In contrast, 
13 At that time, debates in the business media were quite lively, with some 
commentators stressing a potential deﬂ  ation risk and others expressing concern 
about high inﬂ  ation.
Source: Reuters/University of Michigan Survey of Consumers.
Note: Shown are quartiles of the distribution of individuals’ point forecasts.
Chart 1


















Income less than $75,000
Blue lines:
Income more than $75,000
Source: Fed-ALP Panel.
Note: Shown are medians of individuals’ point forecasts of year-ahead changes.
Chart 2
Median Year-Ahead Forecasts for “Prices in General” 












Notes: The median forecast is the median of individuals’ point forecasts; disagreement 
is the interquartile range of individuals’ point forecasts. Uncertainty is measured as 
the sample median of individuals’ density interquartile ranges for year-ahead 
“rate of inflation,” a measure available only since June 2008.
Chart 3
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The decline in forecast uncertainty points to a ﬁ  rming of views 
within both income groups, with each expressing increasingly strong 
convictions about its forecasts. In the second half of 2009, deﬂ  ation con-
cerns seem to diminish within the high-income group, but the gap in 
median inﬂ  ation expectations between the two income groups persists.
Wage Expectations
The recent decline in year-ahead inﬂ  ation expectations has been 
paralleled by a decline in expectations for wage growth (Chart 6). 
Whether gauged by the median of point forecasts or the median of 
inﬂ  ation uncertainty falls steadily in the sample period (measures 
are available only starting in June 2008) and displays little variability 
around and since December 2008. Thus, there is little evidence of a 
meaningful relationship between disagreement and uncertainty.
Other interesting features of the data emerge when we examine 
“rate of inﬂ  ation” expectations  across income groups, differentiat-
ing between high- and low-income respondents. Chart 4 presents 
the median inﬂ  ation forecast and the 25th and 75th percentiles of 
the forecast distribution for each group (with the difference between 
percentiles representing our measure of disagreement for each 
group), while Chart 5 depicts median inﬂ  ation uncertainty for each 
group. We derive several ﬁ  ndings of note. First, disagreement is 
generally higher within the low-income group. Second, as Decem-
ber 2008 approaches, inﬂ  ation expectations diverge across income 
groups, owing mainly to an increased concern about low inﬂ  ation—
or even deﬂ  ation—expressed by high-income respondents. Third, 
disagreement across high-income respondents is marked and 
persistent beginning in December 2008, but disagreement among 
those of low income spikes in the summer of 2008 and then falls to 
pre-crisis levels. We observe very little change in forecast uncertainty 
within each group during the same period. In fact, median forecast 
uncertainty actually declines beginning in the fall of 2008.
Interestingly, two distinct views emerged around the time when 
the federal funds rate approached its lower bound of zero: While the 
high-income group displayed a marked increase in concern about 
the risk of deﬂ  ation, the low-income group generally maintained 
its concern about ongoing inﬂ  ation. In addition, a considerable 
polarization in views occurred within the high-income group, as 
disagreement more than doubled between September and December 
2008 and became comparable to that of the low-income group. 
Source: Fed-ALP Panel.
Note: Shown are 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of individuals’ 
point forecasts.
Chart 4
Year-Ahead Expectations for “Rate of Inflation”  















Income less than $75,000
Blue lines:
Income more than $75,000
Source: Fed-ALP Panel.
Note: Shown are sample medians of individuals’ density interquartile ranges that 
correspond to density forecasts for year-ahead “rate of inflation,” a measure available 
only since June 2008.
Chart 5













Notes: Shown are medians of individuals’ point and density forecasts. Uncertainty 
is measured as the sample median of individuals’ density interquartile ranges 
for year-ahead wage growth.
Chart 6
Trends in Expectations for Wage Growth and Wage 
Uncertainty, One Year Ahead 
Percent
Wage growth density median
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individual density forecasts, expectations for wage growth have been 
consistently below inﬂ  ation expectations over the survey period, im-
plying that most respondents expect an ongoing decline in real wages. 
Individual point forecasts of wage growth have been persistently 
lower than density medians, especially since the beginning of 2009. 
The density forecasts show a recent increase in expected wage growth, 
while the individual point forecasts continue to indicate zero growth. 
Finally, while uncertainty about future wage growth has remained 
relatively stable over the entire sample period, our most recent sur-
vey indicates that such uncertainty is showing a noticeable increase. 
Conclusion
A key goal of the Household Inﬂ  ation Expectations Project has been 
the development of improved survey measures of inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions. While we believe that our new survey measures will enhance 
the ability of policymakers to monitor key aspects of consumer 
inﬂ  ation expectations, much remains to be learned about how con-
sumers form and act on their expectations. In future research, 
we hope to go beyond direct measurement to pursue two paths.
First, we plan to learn more about the way in which households 
form and update their expectations, the speed and manner in which 
expectations respond to price changes and other new information, 
and the role and effects of monetary policy announcements and 
other public sources of information. Second, we expect to study the 
links between inﬂ  ation expectations and consumer behavior, such as 
purchases of housing and other big-ticket items, mortgage reﬁ  nanc-
ing, credit card debt management, investment in human capital 
(for example, student loans), and wage negotiation. 
This work will shed further light on the processes by which 
households form and update their expectations, which in turn may 
assist us in designing survey questions that enable respondents to 
express expectations more accurately. Such research will also be 
helpful in predicting how consumers respond to speciﬁ  c price 
changes and other new information as well as to economic and 
ﬁ  nancial developments. The speed and possible heterogeneity of the 
updating process across individuals can be critical for a central bank 
as it seeks to forecast responses to policy actions and other events.
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